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v

ERRORS I N T H E COMMISSION'S S T A T E M E N T OF FACTS
While most of the factual statements contained in the Commission's Brief are
accurate, the Commission made several significant misstatements that contradict its own
Findings as set forth in the appealed Final Decision. In order to ensure an accurate record
for this appeal, Unocal identifies the misstatements and provides clarifying explanations with
appropriate supporting citations to the record in the first Addendum to this Reply Brief.
ARGUMENT
I.

T H E COMMISSION'S CLAIM T H A T T H E SEVERANCE TAX
STATUTES R E Q U I R E VALUATION OF OIL A N D GAS AT T H E P O I N T
OF E V E N T U A L SALE WAS RESOLVED BY EXXONMOBIL
A N D IS
N O T A N ISSUE B E F O R E T H I S COURT.
Unocal filed its Petition for Review of the Tax Commission's Final Decision by which

it raised issues regarding the prospective application of ExxonMobil, the proper interpretation
of the Court's language giving prospective effect to the ExxonMobil decision, and the
interpretation of severance tax statutory provisions which were not at issue in ExxonMobil
Because the Division did not file a cross-petition, the only issues which are properly
before this Court are those issues which have been identified by the Petitioner, Unocal.
Dairylandlns, Co, v. State FarmMut Auto, Ins, Co,, 882 P.2d 1143, 1144 (Utah 1994) (Court
declined to consider issue for which cross-appeal was not filed); In re Estate of Lewis, 738 P.2d
617, 623 (Utah 1987); Bentlej v. Potter, 694 P.2d 617, 622 (Utah 1984). Nevertheless, the
Commission devotes a significant portion of its brief to its argument that the severance tax
statutes require valuation of oil and gas after processing has occurred. 1

1

The issue raised by the Commission in Section I of its Brief is exacdy the same issue
the Commission raised in the ExxonMobil appeal. This is evidenced by the fact that
1

As the Commission concedes in its own brief, a party may not seek to relitigate an
issue which it has already been fully and fairly litigated, resulting in a final judgment on the
merits. 2 The ExxonMobil Court "reverse [d] the Tax Commission's determination that
severance taxes should be based on the value of oil and gas at the point of eventual sale" and
held that "[valuation must occur in the immediate vicinity of the well, with the oil and gas
remaining in a relatively natural state." ExxonMobil, ^f 24. Because the issue of whether the
severance tax statutes require valuation of oil and gas at the point of sale is not properly
before this Court, Unocal does not deem it appropriate to reply to the Commission's
arguments regarding alleged error in the ExxonMobilCourt's

interpretation of severance tax

laws.
II.

T H I S COURT S H O U L D R E C O N S I D E R T H E PROSPECTIVE RELIEF
LIMITATION OF
EXXONMOBIL.
In its Opening Brief, Unocal explained that this Court has the right to revisit a prior

decision when the issue "did not benefit from the focus and refinement afforded issues
actually litigated in the lower courts" and subsequent events demonstrate that "the decision is
clearly erroneous." Munson v. Chamberlain, 2007 UT 91, ^ 20 and 21. Unocal explained that

approximately 40% of the Commission's argument in the first section of the argument
portion of its brief is lifted verbatim from the brief filed by the Commission in the
ExxonMobil appeal. See Brief of Respondent/Appellee, Auditing Division of the Utah State
Tax Commission ("ExxonMobil'Brief'), filed May 12, 2003, portions of which are attached
hereto, compare Respondent's Brief, pp. 15-16 to ExxonMobil Brief, p. 10; Respondent's Brief,
pp. 19-20 to ExxonMobil Brief, pp. 18-19; Respondent's Brief, pp. 20-21 to ExxonMobil Brief,
pp. 23-24; and Respondent's Brief, pp. 21-22 to ExxonMobil Brief, pp. 24-25, See Addendum,
pp. 0005-0011.
2

See Commission's Brief, pp. 39-43, citing Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 2003 UT 13,
\ 34, 73 P.3d 325, 332.

2

the concerns articulated by the ExxonMobil Court as the basis for the prospective relief
limitation were unfounded because (1) revitalization funds are only impacted when wells are
located on Indian lands; (2) there were no "other relatively small governmental entities"
which would have been impacted by the retroactive application of ExxonMobil, and
(3) revenue concerns articulated by the Court are not implicated by deficiency proceedings.
Unocal also explained that a court's interpretation of a statute should not be limited to
prospective application because the Court's interpretation "is deemed to state the true nature
of the law both retrospectively and prospectively." Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 675 (Utah
1984).
The Commission has not rebutted Unocal's claims that the ExxonMobil decision was
based on a misapprehension of facts, but simply claims that the failure of the "potentially
devastating effects" to materialize "affirms rather than challenges the wisdom of the Court's
decision," Commission's Brief, p. 39, and that claim preclusion and issue preclusion bar
Unocal from asking the Court to reconsider the prospective relief limitation. The
Commission also suggests that taxpayers who relied on the prospective relief limitation and
did not appeal their assessments would be unfairly prejudiced if the relief requested by
Unocal was granted. None of these arguments effectively rebut the application otMunson to
this matter. The Commission likewise fails to respond to Unocal's claim that the prospective
relief limitation is improper in matters of statutory interpretation. As Unocal explained in its
Opening Brief, the ExxonMobilCourt's

decision to limit the application of its decision was

unprecedented and creates dangerous precedent.

3

A.

T h e Concerns Articulated By The ExxonMobil
Materialize Because They Were Unfounded.

Coutt Did N o t

Notwithstanding the Commission's claim to the contrary, the continued solvency of
the Revitalization Funds is not the result of the ExxonMobil Court's decision because, as
Unocal explained in its Opening Brief, the solvency of the Revitalization Funds and "other
relatively small governmental entities" was never threatened by the pending refund requests
and deficiency proceedings.
First, even though ExxonMobil was granted limited retroactive relief and the
Commission ultimately ordered a severance tax refund, that refund was paid out of the state's
General Fund. Unocal's Opening Brief, p. 22, n. 4. Thus, even in the one case where the
Court concluded retroactive application was appropriate, there was no impact whatsoever on
the Revitalization Funds. This suggests that other refund actions, had they been allowed to
proceed, would likewise have had no impact on the Revitalization Funds.
Second, "other relatively small governmental entities" for which the ExxonMobil
Court expressed concern were never threatened by refund requests because all severance
taxes, except for the portion reserved for Revitalization Funds when wells are located on
Indian lands, are remitted to the state's General Fund. Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-115. The
Commission has not rebutted this fact.
Third, application of ExxonMobil'to deficiency assessments posed no threat to the
Revitalization Funds because deficiency assessment do not involve taxes already collected
and spent. Yet by prohibiting the retroactive application of its interpretation of severance tax
law, the Court has effectively allowed the Commission to continue to enforce its erroneous
interpretation of severance tax laws. Thus, even where taxpayers like Unocal have paid their

4

severance taxes based on the correct interpretation of the statute, those taxpayers are forced
to pay additional severance taxes based on the method rejected by this Court in ExxonMobil.
Finally, because the Revitalization Funds only receive severance taxes when the
taxpayer operates wells on Indian lands, those Funds will never be impacted by the
retroactive application o£ ExxonMobil to refund requests by operators of wells not located on
Indian lands. Unocal's wells are not located on Indian lands and yet Unocal has been
precluded from relying on the correct interpretation of severance tax laws because the
ExxonMobil Court feared the potential impact on Revitalization Funds. 3 The Commission
has not rebutted this crucial fact and offers no theory upon which this Court could sustain its
prospective relief limitation in light of this significant oversight.
Even the ExxonMobil'Court

admitted that "the full breadth and depth of the impact

[was] not immediately apparent from the record." ExxonMobil, ^f 23. It is clear now, in view
of the facts in Unocal's Petition, that the concerns articulated by the ExxonMobil Coutt were
unique to the matter before it and did not justify giving only prospective effect to the
decision. The Commission's suggestion that non-occurrence of the "potentially devastating
effects" is the direct result of the Court's prospective effect limitation, is baseless in light of
the uncontroverted facts. This is precisely the kind of error this Court has the right to
correct under Munson v. Chamberlain, 2007 UT 91, ^f 20 ("Although we are normally bound by
our own precedent, we may overrule it where 'the decision is clearly erroneous or conditions
have changed so as to render the prior decision inapplicable.'").

3

Although ExxonMobil had wells on Indian lands, there was no evidence presented
to the ExxonMobil'Court that other taxpayers with pending refund requests had wells on
Indian lands.

5

B.

Neither Issue Preclusion Nor Claim Preclusion Have Application In
This Matter.

The Commission also claims that Unocal is barred from requesting reconsideration of
this issue by the doctrines of claim preclusion and issue preclusion. Claim preclusion applies
when the same party (or their privies) attempt to relitigate a claim which was fully litigated in
a previous action. Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 2003 UT 13 f 34, 73 P.3d 325. Issue
preclusion arises from a different cause of action and applies when (1) the party raising the
issue was "a party or in privity with a party to the prior action"; (2) the issue decided was
identical to the issue raised in the instant action; (3) the issue in the first action was
"completely, fairly, and fully litigated"; and (4) the first suit resulted in a final judgment on
the merits. Id. ^f 35. Neither doctrine has any application to the circumstances pertaining to
the prospective relief issue because (1) Unocal was not in privity with or a party to the
ExxonMobil litigation, and (2) the issue of whether prospective relief should apply was not
fully and fairly Etigated.
1.

Unocal was not in privity with ExxonMobil.

Unlike the Commission, Unocal was not a party to the ExxonMobil appeal. This
Court has held that, '"when the party sought to be precluded was not an actual party in the
first lawsuit,"' "[d]ue process concerns are present.'" Brigham Young University v. Tremco
Consultants, Inc., 2005 UT 19 \ 28, 110 P.3d 678, 686, quoting Tyus v. Schoemehl, 93 F.3d 449,
454 (8th Cir. 1996). In order to ensure that a party is not deprived of its right to a day in
court, this Court has required that the party for which privity is asserted be '"so identified in
interest with another that he represents the same legal right.'" Id., ^[ 29, quoting Searle Bros. v.
Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 691 (Utah 1978).

6

ExxonMobil no longer represented "the same legal right" as Unocal. ExxonMobil
was granted retroactive relief, while Unocal's prospect of relief for the claims which it had
agreed to suspend pending resolution of ExxonMobil's claim was significantly diminished, if
not entirely dashed. Because the Court gave retroactive effect to its decision for
ExxonMobil, ExxonMobil had no interest in the Petition for Rehearing and, in fact, did not
participate in that Petition. 4 For that reason alone, this Court should recognize that Unocal
was not in privity with ExxonMobil with regard to the prospective relief issue. Unocal's
limited participation in the prior proceeding does not render Unocal subject to res judicata.
TRW, Inc. v. Ellipse Corp., 495 F.2d 314, 318 (7th Or. 111. 1974) (limited role of observing
proceedings and filing amicus briefs "are insufficient modes of participation to render
applicable the doctrine of res judicata."), citingBrown-Crummer Investment Co. v. Paulter, 70 F.2d
184 (10th Or. 1934).
2.

The prospective relief issue was not fully and fairly litigated.

In its Opening Brief, Unocal explained that this Court "did not benefit from the focus
and refinement afforded issues actually litigated in lower courts" because the prospective
relief issue was not raised by either party to the appeal, but by the amici Navajo

4

Ironically, when Unocal and other similarly situated amici filed the Petition for
Rehearing, the Commission moved to strike the Petition, claiming that the amicus parties did
not have the right to request rehearing because "[a]n amicus is not a party to the action and
cannot assume the functions of a party." Commission's Reply Memorandum in Support of
Motion to Strike, p. 2, Case No. 20021023-SC, filed December 15, 2003, See Addendum,
p. 0013, see also Commission's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike, filed
Dec. 10, 2003 ("The consent of the parties to participate initially in filing an amicus curiae
brief does not extend to the amicus the full rights of a party to the litigation."), Addendum,
p. 0016. Now, the Commission reverses its position claiming that "Unocal established
privity with ExxonMobil upon participating in the prior action." Commission's Brief, p. 42.

7

RevitaKzation Fund and the Uintah Basin Revitalization Fund. The Commission erroneously
claims that Unocal had the opportunity to "fully address" the prospective limitation issue and
that the Court was "fully informed of the potential for its decision." Commission's Brief,
p. 40.
The truth of the matter is that the only time Unocal or any of the other similarly
situated amicus parties addressed the prospectivity issue was in the Memorandum in Support
of Petition for Rehearing filed two weeks after the ExxonMobil decision had been issued.5
The Commission moved to strike the Petition for Rehearing on the grounds that Unocal and
the other petitioning parties were amicus parties and, therefore, did not have standing to
request a rehearing. The Court denied the Petition without a hearing and did not provide
any explanation for its ruling.6 Thus, contrary to the Commission's representations, Unocal
never had "full opportunity to argue its position." Id. There is no basis for this Court to
conclude that the issue of the prospective relief limitation has been fully and fairly litigated.
This Court should not hesitate to revisit the prospectivity issue if it concludes that the

5

This issue was not raised until two months after Unocal and the supporting amici
parties had already filed their amicus briefs. Unocal's Opening Brief, p. 18. In addition,
neither the Commission, nor the Division of Oil, Gas & Mining and the Utah Association of
Counties which also filed amicus briefs, ever requested or discussed a prospective relief
limitation in their briefs.
6

At the time the Petition for Rehearing was pending, an amendment to Rule 35 was
also pending which would have prohibited an amicus party from filing a petition for
rehearing. That amendment was adopted by April 1, 2004. Utah R. App. P., Rule 35(e).
This pending amendment was referred to by the Commission in its Reply Memorandum in
Support of Motion to Strike, but because the Court provided no grounds for its denial of the
Petition for Rehearing, it is not clear whether the Petition was denied on its merits or for
alleged procedural defects.
8

absence of a record on this issue resulted in an erroneous decision. Munson, 2007 UT 91, ^f 20.
C.

The Failure Of Other Taxpayers To Challenge The Prospective Relief
Limitation Is N o Grounds For Denying Relief T o Unocal.

The Commission warns that reversal of the prospective effect limitation "at this point
in time would be unfair to those taxpayers who justifiably relied upon the Court's decision
and would be barred by the statute of limitations from now filing claims." Commission's
Brief, p. 43. 7 The outcome of this issue should not depend on whether all severance
taxpayers can be made whole. Statutes of limitations have always precluded potential
litigants from obtaining relief to which they would otherwise be entided, but for the lapse of
time. No court has ever denied a litigant relief to which it is legally entided simply because
other similarly situated parties have neglected to assert their claims in a timely manner. The
taxpayers which the Commission suggests will be treated unfairly if Unocal prevails, were
already singled out for unfair treatment when this Court declined to give retroactive effect to
its decision in ExxonMobil

Unocal has expended considerable time and resources to

challenge the Commission's erroneous application of severance tax provisions which were
not at issue in ExxonMobil, and, at the same time, has pursued its claim that the prospective
effect limitation was erroneously applied by this Court. The fact that other taxpayers may
not have exercised their legal rights in a timely manner is no basis for denying Unocal's

7

The Commission's concern for fairness to the taxpayers is ironic inasmuch as the
Commission has persisted in enforcing an interpretation of the severance tax provisions
which is contrary to the correct interpretation as determined by the ExxonMobil Court. The
Commission seems to believe that fair treatment is only essential when it would result in
additional tax liability.
9

request that the Court overrule the prospective effect limitation and allow Unocal to rely on
the correct interpretation of the severance tax laws.
D.

T h e Prospective Relief Limitation Is Improper Because
Presented A Matter Of Statutory Interpretation.

ExxonMobil

As Unocal explained in its Opening Brief, the ExxonMobil Court erred when it gave
prospective effect to its decision because the decision did not establish a new rule of law.
McCloskey v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal'Bd., 460 A.2d 237, 239 (Pa. 1983) ("[T|he test as
to whether a decision is applied prospectively or retroactively is whether it articulates a new
and unforeshadowed rule of law."). When a court answers "a specific question about the
meaning of a statute, [its] initial interpretation does not announce a newr rule of law." Fiore v.
White, 562 Pa. 634, 644,757 A.2d 842, 848 (2000). Accordingly, concerns for retroactivity are
not implicated in matters of statutory interpretation. Fiore v. White, 531 U.S. 225, 228 (U.S.
2001). 8 The Commission's brief is devoid of any response to Unocal's discussion on this
point.
The ExxonMobil Court unquestionably engaged in statutory interpretation.
ExxonMobil, fflf 10, 14, 19, 20, and 22. The Court did not change the existing law, nor did it
declare the statute unconstitutional. It simply applied well-established principles of statutory

8

The availability of retroactive relief in matters of statutory interpretation was
decisively addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Fiore v. White. The Court had certified a
question to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court asking whether a prior decision {Scarpone) which
the petitioner sought to have applied in his case was a new law or a clarification of existing
law. The state supreme court explained that Scarpone "did not announce a new rule of law
[but] merely clarified the plain language of the statute." Fiore, 562 Pa. at 646, 757 A.2d at
848-849. The U.S. Supreme Court then held that there was "no issue of retroactivity"
because the statute in question was "not new law," but "was the law of Pennsylvania — as
properly interpreted - at the time of Fiore's conviction." 531 U.S. at 228.
10

interpretation to determine the correct interpretation of the statute. Id. at f 14. In Malan v.
Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 675 (Utah 1984), this Court held that "[t]he general rule from time
immemorial is that the ruling of a court is deemed to state the true nature of the law both
retrospectively and prospectively." Thus, when the ExxonMobil Court interpreted the
severance tax provisions at issue therein, its interpretation was a determination of "the true
nature of the law both retrospectively and prospectively." Because the ExxonMobil decision
was a matter of statutory interpretation, a fact which the Commission does not dispute, it
was "not new law" and "presented] no issue of retroactivity." Fiore v. White, 531 U.S. at 228.
If this Court allows the prospective relief limitation to remain in place, then an agency's
persistent misinterpretation of a statute will be sufficient to establish a new rule of law even
when that interpretation is not supported by the language of the statute. See discussion,
Unocal's Opening Brief, pp. 25-32.
III.

T H I S COURT'S D E C I S I O N N O T T O APPLY EXXONMOBIL

TO

" P E N D I N G " MATTERS S H O U L D B E I N T E R P R E T E D LITERALLY,
Unocal does not believe that the prospective effect limitation was appropriate in this
case. However, in the event this Court upholds the limitation, it should apply the limitation
in accordance with the express language of the ExxonMobil Court
when it issued the prospective relief limitation in ExxonMobilstating,

This Court spoke plainly
"as to other parties who

may have refund requests, deficiency proceedings, or similar matters pending

before the Tax

Commission, our holding is to apply prospectively only." ExxonMobil, ^J 24 (emphasis
added). Despite this plain language, the Commission refused to abate the deficiency
assessment for the Second Audit Period even though the assessment was not "pending"
when the ExxonMobil decision was issued, but was issued nearly a year later.
11

The Commission argues that all prospective relief limitations, by definition, apply to
time periods preceding the issuance of the decision containing the limitation, even if the
claim results from an action taken by the Commission after the decision was issued.
Alternatively, the Commission claims that Unocal's appeal of the deficiency assessment for
the Second Audit Period was "pending" during ExxonMobil because it raises the same issues
which were resolved by ExxonMobil, Neither theory excuses the Commission's decision to
ignore the parameters established by the ExxonMobil Court.
A,

The Commission's Decision Ignores The ExxonMobil'Court's
Exercise
Of Its Recognized Right To Establish The Scope Of Its Prospective
Effect Limitation.

The Commission cited American Trucking Ass'ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 177 (U.S.
1990), in support of its claim that a court's issuance of a prospective effect limitation
automatically prohibits the retroactive application of the relevant decision to all matters
arising prior to the issuance of the decision. Thus, the Commission suggests that the
ExxonMobil Court's statement that the prospective relief limitation only applies to "refund
requests, deficiency proceedings, or similar matters pending

before the Tax Commission,"

does not prohibit it from assessing new taxes for periods prior to the issuance of that
decision. ExxonMobil, ^f 24.
The Commission's characterization of the American Trucking case ignores the U.S.
Supreme Court's distinction between state and federal issues. The Court recognized that
when a state court is interpreting state law, it has the authority to determine the scope of any
limitation on retroactive application-' c When questions of state law are at issue, state courts
generally have the authority to determine the retroactivity of their own decisions." The
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ExxonMobil Court exercised that authority when it held that its ruling would not apply to
"refund requests, deficiency proceedings, or similar matters pending

be fore the Tax

Commission." ExxonMobil, \ 24.9
Resolution of this issue requires the Court to look no further than the plain language
of the ExxonMobil decision. Just as the Court relied on the plain language of Rio Algom to
determine the scope of the prospective relief limitation in Kennecott, this Court should likewise
adhere to its own plain directive.
B.

This Court's Prospective Effect Limitation Applied To "Deficiency
Proceedings"- N o t Issues-Which Were Pending During

ExxonMobil

Because the Commission is well-aware that the deficiency assessment was not
pending at the time the ExxonMobil decision was issued, the Commission suggests that the
prospective effect limitation applies because the issues raised by the later appeal "were
pending before the Tax Commission at the time ExxonMobil was decided." Commission
Brief, p. 38-39. If the prospective effect limitation truly meant that the ExxonMobil decision
would not be applied to all cases wherein the valuation issues are the same as the issues
raised by ExxonMobil, then the ExxonMobil case would have no application whatsoever. The
essence of a prospective effect limitation is that an issue is resolved one way prior to the
issuance of the decision, and another way thereafter. The Commission's interpretation
would essentially void the decision which is meant to be prospectively applied.

9

By suggesting that this Court has the authority to define the parameters of a
prospective effect limitation, Unocal is not suggesting that the Court had the right to apply
the prospective effect doctrine in the ExxonMobil case.
13

The Commission's claim that die deficiency assessment which was issued in 2004 was
"pending" in 2003 because it involved issues raised in ExxonMobil, also ignores the plain
language of the Court's requirement that what must be pending is the "refund requests,
deficiency proceedings, or similar matters." ExxonMobil, \ 24. The Court was "cogni2ant of
the various available options" for crafting a prospective relief limitation, Kennecott Corp, v.
Utah State Tax Comm\ 862 P.2d 1348, 1350-1351 (Utah 1993), and specifically limited the
scope of that limitation to only those matters which were "pending before the Tax
Commission." ExxonMobil, \ 24. If the Court declines to overrule the prospective relief
limitation, it should, at the very least, apply that limitation in accordance with the plain
limiting language of the ExxonMobil
C.

Court

The Enforcement Of Post-ExxonMobil
Deficiency Assessments Which
Violate The Correct Interpretation Of the Statute Violates Due Process.

This Court applied well-established principles of statutory interpretation when it
determined that valuation for severance tax purposes "must occur in the immediate vicinity
of the well, with the oil and gas remaining in a relatively natural state." ExxonMobil, ^j 24.
The deficiency assessment issued nearly one year after this interpretation of the statute was
provided, assesses severance taxes based on the value of the oil and gas at the point of
eventual sale-precisely the valuation method rejected by this Court. Id. The Commission
has upheld that deficiency assessment, requiring Unocal to pay nearly $1 million in severance
taxes based on a statutory interpretation rejected by this Court. The Commission's
acquiescence in this practice essentially leaves the taxpayer without any means to redress
wrongfully assessed taxes. Clearly the assessment does not comport with statutory language.
See ExxonMobil

Yet, the taxpayer is left without the ability to challenge the assessment in any
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meaningful way because the Commission refused to apply the ExxonMobil decision to
matters which were not "pending before the Tax Commission"at the time the ExxonMobil
decision was rendered. Id. at ^f 24.
IV.

T H E COMMISSION E R R E D I N ITS I N T E R P R E T A T I O N OF STATUTES
W H I C H H A D N O T B E E N AT ISSUE I N
EXXONMOBIL.
There are four statutory provisions which Unocal claims were disregarded by the

Commission when it sustained the deficiency assessments. First, the Commission erred
when it upheld the deficiency assessments even though they were not based on the value of
the oil and gas as it was "transported from the field," as required by Utah Code Ann. § 59-5102(l)(a). Second, the Commission erred when it refused to find error in the Division's use
of sweet oil postings to value sour oil in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-103(l)(b).
Third, the Commission erred when it upheld the Division's refusal to allow statutorily
available deductions for transportation and processing costs. Id. § 59-5-101(7), (11), and (17).
Finally, the Commission erred in upholding the Division's interpretation of the annual
exemption. Id. § 59-5-102(2)(a).
The Commission defends its statutory interpretations by claiming that the statutes
require valuation of oil and gas after processing has been completed. The ExxonMobil Court
has already rejected that argument and the Commission's duplication of its arguments to the
ExxonMobil Count are simply not relevant to the issues of statutory interpretation raised by
this appeal. The prospective effect limitation does not protect the Commission from
challenges to statutory provisions which were not the subject of the

ExxonMobillitigation.

Therefore, the prc-ExxonMobil practices which may have existed with regard to the statutes
Unocal claims have been violated, are simply not relevant.
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A.

The Commission Ignored The Statutory Requirement That Oil And Gas
Be Valued When It Is "Transported Off The Field/'

Until the Formal Hearing took place, the Division was not aware that the Lisbon
Plant was not located on the Lisbon Unit. The Commission made the factual finding that
the Plant was off the field, but sustained the deficiency assessments because "it [had] not
been shown that this fact would have affected the assessments under the Division's preExxonMobilpractices."

R. 53. As Unocal explained in its brief, the Division's pre-

ExxonMobil practices could provide no defense once Unocal established that the statutory
requirement that the oil or gas be valued when it was "transported off the field" had been
disregarded. There is simply no precedent for the Commission's determination that a plain
statutory provision may be ignored if the taxing entity demonstrates an established practice
of disregarding that provision.
The Commission defends its refusal to find error in the assessments stating that it
"did not deem it significant that the gas plant was less than 1/4 mile off the lease."
Commission's Brief, p. 22. The statutory requirement that oil or gas be valued when it is
"transported from the field" does not depend on whether the product is transported 1/4
mile or 400 miles from the field boundaries. Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-102(l)(a). Even the
Division's own witness had acknowledged that '"the proper point of valuation would be
before [the oil and gas] went into the plant.'" R. 40. According to the plain statutory
language, the taxable event occurred at the moment the product left the boundaries of the
field.
The Commission also claims that calculation of value at the point the product left the
field would have resulted in a higher tax. The allegation that the tax would have been higher
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is likewise no defense of the Commission's disregard of plain statutory language.10 If correct
application of the statute would have resulted in a higher tax, the Commission should have
applied the statute according to its plain language. However, it is strains reason to suggest
that Unocal's severance tax liability would be increased as a result of the taxing the oil and
gas when it was "transported from the field" inasmuch as the Division and, now, the
Commission have vigorously opposed the application of the statute.
The resolution of the legal issue of whether the Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-102(l)(a)
requires valuation of the oil or gas at the point when the product is "transported from the
field," does not require this Court to make any factual determinations. The Commission's
claim that application of the statute would result in a higher tax is immaterial. The
Commission's claim that Unocal's initial calculations in its refund request were based on
plant volumes is likewise immaterial. This Court should simply resolve the legal issue and
then vacate the deficiency assessment because it does not comply with the statutory
requirement that the oil and gas be valued when it is "transported from the field."

10

The Commission's claim that the taxes would be higher should the oil and gas be
valued as it left the field should not be taken into account by the Court as it determines the
correct interpretation of the statute. First, the Commission did not make any factual findings
at the conclusion of the Formal Hearing regarding whether the oil or gas would have a higher
value if it were valued when it was "transported from the field." Second, the method
referred to by the Commission in its Brief (which was proposed by the Division in a hearing
exhibit) is not one of the statutory valuation methods and, therefore, could not be used to
determine value. Finally, the Commission's claim that the correct application of the statute
would result in a higher tax is not supported by the testimony of the Division's witness. In
the section of the transcript referred to by the Commission in support of its disregard of the
statute, Ms. Goss testified that the calculation of the value of oil and gas when it left the field
could not be made without taking into account the costs associated with the plant, stating
that "it depends on, really on the costs of the plant." R. 2, p. 340 lines 9-10.
17

B.

The Commission Erred When It Upheld The Division's U s e Of Sweet
Oil Postings T o Value Sour Oil In T h e Second Deficiency Assessment.

This point of error is only relevant to the second deficiency assessment. Utah Code
Ann. § 59-5-103(l)(b) allows valuation to occur based on "consideration of information
relevant in valuing like-quality

oil or gas at the wellin the same field or nearby fields or

areas such as: posted prices, prices received in arm's-length spot sales, or other reliable public
sources of price or market information . . . ."
Unocal believes that, if this Court does not reconsider the prospective relief
limitation, then, at the very least, that limitation does not apply to the second deficiency
assessment because it was not "pending" at the time the ExxonMobil decision was issued.
Therefore, the valuation of the oil produced during the second audit period must comply
with the ExxonMobil requirement that valuation "occur in the immediate vicinity of the well,
with the oil and gas remaining in a relatively natural state." ExxonMobil, jf 24. Alternatively,
the oil must be valued in its natural sour state because it was "transported from the field" in
that condition. See discussion at III, A, supra.
The Commission affirmed the Division's use of the posted price method because the
Giant's Paradox Basin oil was "in a similar 'sweet' state as Unocal's oil at the point

of

eventual sale, i.e., the tailgate of the Lisbon Plant." R. 41 (emphasis added). Because the
ExxonMobil Court has already rejected the Commission's claim that "severance taxes should
be based on the value of oil and gas at the point of eventual sale" id. (emphasis added),
the Commission is wrong to suggest that available price information, contract or otherwise,
for "completed production which transfer tide or possession at the approved measurement
point for the field" is determinative of value for the second audit period, li ExxonMobil
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dots

not apply, the Commission is still wrong because the oil should have been valued in the
condition it was in when it was "transported from the field." Utah Code Ann. § 59-5102(l)(a).
The Commission defends its decision to uphold the assessment by suggesting that
Unocal bore the burden of "show[ing] that there are no arm's length contracts, then no nonarm Vlength contracts which would be comparable to arm's length contracts for purchases
of like-quality gas or oil in the same field." Commission's Brief, p. 24. Unocal met its
burden when it persuaded the Commission that "the sour oil produced from the
Mississippian Pool was not of like quality to [that] sweet oil." R. 27 at ^f 90. The only pricing
information which would be relevant for purposes of establishing value of the oil produced
from the Mississippian Pool is pricing information for sour oil. Because the Commission
upheld the Division's use of posted prices for sweet oil, it did not make any findings with
regard to other possible comparable posted prices. The Commission's suggestion, at this
stage of the litigation, that other posted prices could have been used to value the sour oil, or
that adjustments could be made to reflect the lesser quality of the oil are not relevant to this
Court's determination of whether the Commission properly interpreted the statutory
valuation methodology requiring "consideration of information relevant in valuing likequality oil or gas at the well."
C.

The Commission Erred When It Held That Federal Regulations
Superseded Statutory Provisions.

As Unocal explained in its Opening Brief, the Commission erred when it held that it
was not required to "employ the guidance found in the Section 59-5-101 net-back
definitions" unless "the federal regulations are silent as to an issue." R. 45. This represents a
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gross departure from established law which is that "an agency's rules must be consistent with
its governing statutes." Sanders Brine Shrimp v. Audit Division, Utah State Tax Comrn'n, 846 P.2d
1304 (Utah 1993).
Unocal does not dispute that section 4 of House Bill 63 was still in effect during the
First and Second Audit Periods. However, as Unocal explained in its brief, the rules
incorporated by that section have no more force than administrative rules which could have
been adopted by the Commission during that time and would still have been subordinate to
any applicable statute. Insofar as the federal regulations conflict with plain statutory
language, those rules are not enforceable. Id.
Unocal explained that the statute permits the deduction of "reasonable actual costs of
transporting oil or gas products from the well to the point of sale" whereas the federal
regulation does not permit the deduction of gathering costs, which are defined as the
movement of product to a point off the lease. Unocal's Brief, pp. 43-44. Unocal also
explained that the statutory definition of "processing costs" does not restrict the amount of
processing costs which may be deducted to calculate the value of NGLs. Utah Code Ann.
§59-5-101(ll). n

11

The only reason the processing allowance was not increased for 1994 and 1995 was
that Unocal had not obtained MMS approval for those years as required by the federal
regulations. Inasmuch as the requirement for MMS approval is not statutory, but is imposed
by federal regulations, its exceeds the scope of the statute and is not enforceable." Morgan
County, 2001 U T 57 ^J 7 ("rules are subordinate to statutes and cannot confer greater rights or
disabilities"). Despite its approval of a 99% processing allowance for 1996 through 1999, the
Commission now suggests that Unocal deducted improper costs to derive its processing
allowance. Commission's Brief, pp. 30-31. N o such finding was made by the Commission in
the Final Decision and the Commission's approval of the deductions for 1996 through 1999
should foreclose it from now challenging the same deductions for the 1994 and 1995
assessment years.
20

The Commission has not refuted the fact that there is a material difference between
the statutory definitions of "transportation costs" and "processing costs" and the federal
regulations upon which the Commission relied. The Commission's conclusion that it was
"bound by the federal regulations" despite its undisputed conflict with a plain statutory
provision violates this Court's long-standing recognition that "rules are subordinate to
statutes and cannot confer greater rights or disabilities." Morgan County v. Holnam, Inc. and
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2001 UT 57 ^J 7, 29 P.3d 629, quoting SF Phosphates Co. v. Auditing Div.,
972 P.2d 384, 386 (Utah 1988) {quoting Rocky Mountain Energy v. State Tax Comm\ 852 P.2d
284, 287 (Utah 1993)).
The Commission also claims that Unocal is robbing the citizens of this state by
deducting processing and transportation costs to determine the value of its oil and gas. This
allegation ignores the findings of the ExxonMobil Court. The Court unequivocally rejected
the Commission's position, resurrected in this case, that "severance taxes should be based on
the value of oil and gas at the point of eventual sale." Id. The Court held that the severance
tax must be based on the value of the oil and gas "in a relatively natural state." ExxonMobil,
^| 24. The fact that Unocal has incurred significant costs to make the oil and gas marketable
does not entitle the citizens of this state to impose a tax on the expenses associated with
Unocal's efforts. Those efforts do not represent a taxable resource of the State. Likewise,
the Commission's protestations notwithstanding, the value of oil and gas in 2008 is irrelevant
to the value of oil and gas in 1994 through 1999.12

12

Although it is tempting to reply to the Commission's allegation that severance tax
"shortchanges future generations" if it does not reflect the fact that "resources which are
taken from the state become more valuable over time," the absurdity of that position is self21

D.

The Commission Erred In Its Interpretation Of T h e Annual Well
Exemption.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-5~102(5)(a) creates an annual exemption for the first

$50,000 in gross value of production from "each well or wells." This Court, in matters of
statutory interpretation, has consistently recognized that '"each term in the statute was used
advisedly," and has required that "the statutory words are read literally, unless such a
reading is unreasonably

confused

or inoperable!"

Atlas Steel v. Utah State Tax Comm'n,

2002 UT 112, PI 9 (Utah 2002), quoting County Bd. of Equalisation of Wasatch County v. State Tax
Common, 944 P.2d 370, 373 (Utah 1997) {quoting Savage Indus., Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 811
P.2d 664, 670 (Utah 1991)) (emphasis added).
The Commission's claim that the "well exemption" is a "field exemption," ignores the
literal meaning of the words of the statute and results in an "unreasonably confused or
inoperable" exemption. Id. In its Final Decision, the Commission relied on the definition of
"well or wells" as "any extractive means" to conclude that "the operation of a number of
wells to extract oil and gas would appear to be a single means of extraction." R. 50.13 This
conclusion ignores the ExxonMobilCourt's

interpretation of the statutory definition of "well

or wells" and strains the literal meaning of the terms of the statutes.
In ExxonMobil, this Court rejected the Commission's claim that "value at the well" did
not refer to each individual well. In reaching this conclusion, the Court examined the

evident and does not merit a response. See Commission's Brief, p. 32.
13

The statute defines "well or wells" as "any extractive means from which oil or gas
is produced or extracted, located within an oil or gas field, and operated by one person."
Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-101(20).
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statutory definition of "well or wells" and determined that "a well is an 'extractive means.'"
ExxonMobil, ^J 16. This conclusion cannot be reconciled with the Commission's conclusion
that "there is no evidence to suggest that each well should be considered a separate extractive
means." R. 50.
The Commission's characterization of the exemption as a "field exemption" ignores
the plain language of the exemption. Had the Legislature intended to provide a single
exemption for each field, it would have used the term "field," rather than "well or wells." In
addition, the statutory definition of "well or wells" recognizes that while wells may be located
within a field-they are not one in the same. The Commission's claim that the well
exemption is a field exemption requires this Court to ignore plain statutory language.
The Commission's claim that the "well exemption" is a "field exemption," also results
in an "unreasonably confused or inoperable" exemption. Id. Because wells in a single field
are not typically owned by the same entities, the exemption applicable to each well, under the
Commission's interpretation, will be entirely dependant on how many wells each particularly
entity owns within the field.14 For example, if three entities collectively own 30 wells in a
single field, then, under the Commission's interpretation, they share a single $50,000
exemption. ($50,000 + 30 = $1666).15 Each well would receive an exemption for the first

14

The Division's witness acknowledged that "[a] lot of plants have other production
going into the plant. So they have to measure your production versus someone else's
production so that the plant will know how to prorate the production that goes out of the
plant." R. 2 (Goss test. Day 2, p. 336 1. 15-17).
15

Despite the Commission's claim to the contrary, the requirement that the
exemption be prorated does not support its claim that the exemption applies to a group of
wells. Rather it is an implicit recognition of the fact that most wells have more than one
owner.
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$1666 of product, to be prorated amongst the three owners. If the well owners divide up the
wells equally, each having separate title to 10 wells, then each owner will receive a $50,000
exemption so that the amount applicable to each well would be $5000 ($50,000 -=- 10), nearly
three times the exemption resulting from shared ownership of all wells on the field. Also,
under the Commission's interpretation, if a separate entity owns a single well in the same
field, that owner is entitled to a full $50,000 exemption on his single well even though the
well is in the same field as the other 30 wells. The interpretation advocated by the
Commission results in an inconsistent exemption-$50,000 for some well owners and a
fraction of that for other well owners. The only way this exemption can be fairly and
uniformly applied is to give effect to the statute's plain language and recognize an exemption
for "each well or wells."
Finally, Unocal's interpretation is consistent with the legislature's use of the word
"wells" in other statutory exemptions which apply to single wells. As Unocal pointed out in
its Opening Brief, there are several other severance tax exemptions wherein the term "wells"
is used and the exemption is applied to all qualifying wells within a field. The Commission
has not rebutted this crucial fact. See e.g § 59-5-102(2)(b) (production from "stripper welW
exempt even when stripper wells coexist with other producing wells in same field); § 59-5102(2)(d) (exemption for "first six months of production for wells started after
January 1, 1984, but before January 1, 1990").
The historical practice of the Division, in treating this exemption as a "field
exemption," is simply not determinative. Either the exemption is applicable to "each well or
wells" or it is not. Clearly, the characterization of the exemption as a "field exemption"
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requires a fundamental alteration in the language of the exemption. Moreover, it ignores the
fact that not all wells in a field are owned by the same entity or entities.16 The only way to
give consistent meaning to the well exemption is to apply it in the manner suggested by
Unocal. 17
CONCLUSION
Based on the arguments set forth in both its Opening and Reply Briefs, Unocal
respectfully asks the Court for the rulings and relief requested in its Opening Brief.
D A T E D this 2nd day of September, 2008.
W O O D CRAPO LLC

David J. Crapo
Attorneysfor Petitioner
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The Commission also claims that its interpretation of the rule is "consistent with
the concept of one 'entity'. . . ." and by the fact that "[t]he Veil or well's producing in a unit
are given a single entity number." Commission's Brief, p. 34. However, the definition of
"entity" is irrelevant to the well exemption because the exemption does not apply to an
"entity," but to "the first $50,000 annually in gross value of each well or wells . . . ." Utah
Code Ann. § 59-5-102(2). Furthermore, the entity number is the number which identifies the
well owner(s). Each well has its own API Well Number in addition to a "Well Name." The
site maintained by the Division of Oil and Gas also keeps separate historical data for each
individual well.
http://ongas.ogm.utah.gov/Data_Center/LiveData_Search/well_information.htm.
17

The Commission has not responded to Unocal's claim that the exemption should
not have been prorated for 1999 because, by its express terms, it applies to "the first
$50,000 annually in gross value of each well or wells
" Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-102(2).
Accordingly, Unocal provides no additional argument on this issue and requests the Court
interpret this provision as requested in its Opening Brief.
25
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ERRORS I N T H E COMMISSION'S S T A T E M E N T OF FACTS
Unocal believes the Commission made several misstatements in its Brief that should
be corrected for purposes of the record in this appeal. Unocal hereby identifies the
misstatements and provides clarifying explanations with appropriate supporting citations to
the record:
Commission's Statement of Fact ^f 18: "Thirty percent of the gas plant is related to
production of helium and sulfur. R.E. 53."
Unocal's Response: While Unocal does not believe this is a material fact to the issues
to be resolved by this Court, the Commission never made any findings regarding what
percentage of the gas plant costs were related to production of helium and sulfur. The
Commission's reference to "R.E." to support this alleged fact is to what the Commission has
labeled "Respondent's Exhibit Binder." The "Respondent" at the Formal Hearing was the
Auditing Division. That party should not be confused with the "Respondent" Commission
in this proceeding. In other words, the exhibit referred to does not represent the findings of
the Commission, the Respondent in this Petition. Accordingly, it is not appropriate for the
Commission to present the Division's allegation as a "Statement of Fact" inasmuch as it was
not a finding of the Commission in its Final Decision. 1

1

While the Commission did not make a finding as to the percentage of the plant that
was used to produce helium and sulfur, it did recognize that the removal of several
contaminants was necessary for making the oil and gas marketable. R. 19, ^f 47 - R. 20, ^f 53.
It found that "sulfur is removed and processed so that it can be sold." R. 20, ^ 53. It also
referenced Mr. Wimberly's testimony that "the costs of treating the sulfur far exceed any
revenue generated by the sales of the sulfur byproduct" Id. The Commission also found
that "Helium is removed from the gas stream at the helium plant for further processing and
sale." Id H56.

Commission's Statement of Fact ^| 20: "Separation of the oil, water, sulfur, natural
gas, NGLs and helium occurs at the Lisbon Plant R.E.'s 5, 25."
Unocal's Response: The Commission found that the oil, gas, and water was initially
separated at the wellhead. R. 15, ^f 26. It was then recombined and transported to the
Lisbon Plant After arrival at the Plant, the oil, water, and gas was separated and the
contaminants removed. R. 18-19, ^j 45.
Commission's Statement of Fact ^[ 22: "Following separation, the oil goes to storage
tanks which are located near the Lisbon Plant From the tanks, oil is sold or

transported

from the Geld at the approved unit measurement point via pipeline, pursuant to arm's length
contracts. R.E.'s 1, 5, 25." (Emphasis added).
Unocal's Response: The Commission found that the oil was "transported from the
field" before it ever reached the Lisbon Plant R. 18, ^f 42 ("When the oil or gas arrives at the
Lisbon Plant, it is no longer on the property designated as the Lisbon Unit or Lisbon
participating area."). This finding of fact was not appealed by the Division. It is
inappropriate for the Commission to make a factual allegation which is contrary to its own
findings. The exhibits referred to as support for the Commission's factual misstatement are
exhibits which were prepared by the Respondent/Division in advance of the Formal
Hearing. Prior to the hearing, the Division was under the erroneous impression that the
Lisbon Plant was located within the parameters of the Lisbon Field. R. 30-31. Therefore,
any representation contained in exhibits prepared prior to the hearing were based on that
erroneous assumption.

Commission's Statement of Fact ^| 26: ". . . The gas is sold or transported
fields

from the

a meter which is at the tailgate of the Lisbon Plant, pursuant to arm's length

contracts. (R.E. 1, 25.)." (Emphasis added).
Unocal's Response: See discussion re. Commission's Statement of Fact ^j 22, supra.
Commission's Statement of Fact % 27: "The NGLS are sold or transported

from

the field via pipeline at the tailgate of the Lisbon Gas Plant, pursuant to arm's length
contracts. R.E. 1, 25." (Emphasis added).
Unocal's Response: See discussion re. Commission's Statement of Fact ^f 22, supra.
Commission's Statement of Fact ^| 38: "Unocal paid a quarterly installment for the
period January 1, 1998 to March 31, 1998. No severance tax return was filed for 1998.
R.E. 23."
Unocal's Response: During 1998, Unocal filed quarterly returns, but neglected to file
the annual return. The Division assessed a penalty for failure to file the annual return which
was abated by the Commission because it "allows a waiver if a taxpayer has an excellent
record of compliance." R. 52. The Commission found that " Unocal has such a record." Id.
The Division did not cross-appeal the Commission's abatement of the penalty. By stating
that Unocal did not file a return for 1998, the Commission creates the impression that
Unocal was wilfully failing to comply with tax laws, despite the Commission's own
determination that Unocal had "an excellent record of compliance." Id.
Commission's Statement of Fact ^ 42: "On July 8, 2004, the Auditing Division issued
a Statutory Notice of deficiency for the conservation fee for the period January 1, 1998
through December 31, 1999. Unocal did not timely appeal this notice. P.E. 14, R. 989."

Unocal's Response: In the appeal before the Commission, the Division had claimed
that the Commission did not have jurisdiction over the 1998 and 1999 appeals because of
Unocal's failure to appeal the original statutory notices. However, the Commission found
that those notices were sent to the wrong party and would not infer a responsibility for
Unocal to appeal from notices it had not received. Inasmuch as the Commission concluded
that Unocal had no responsibility to file timely appeals of those notices, it is puzzling that the
Commission, in its brief, repeatedly accuses Unocal of failing to file timely appeals of the
1998 and 1999 Notices of Appeal. See Commission's Brief, p. 2 ("Unocal never appealed
those notices."); p. 4 ("The Commission found that it had jurisdiction over Appeals 04-1283
and 04-1284 for the tax years 1998 and 1999 despite the fact that no Petition was filed within
30 days of the original Statutory Notice."); pp. 12-13 ("On July 8, 2004, the Auditing
Division issued a Statutory Notice of deficiency for the conservation fee for the period
January 1, 1998 through December 31, 1999. Unocal did not timely appeal this notice.");
p. 13 ("On July 8, 2004, the Auditing Division issued a Statutory Notice of deficiency for the
severance tax period January 1, 1998 through December 31, 1999. Unocal did not timely
appeal this notice."); p. 38 ("[The Division] resent the statutory notice after Unocal failed to
appeal"). These statements misrepresent the findings and conclusions of the Commission
and should be disregarded by this Court
Commission's Statement of Fact % 44: "On July 8, 2004, the Audiiting Division issued
a Statutory Notice of deficiency for the severance tax period January 1, 1998 through
December 31, 1999. Unocal did not timely appeal this notice. R. 990
Unocal's Response: See discussion re. Commission's Statement of Fact ^[ 42, supra.
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POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
I.

JNDER UTAH LAW THE VALUE OF OIL FOR SEVERANCE TAX
PURPOSES IS DETERMINED AT THE POINT PRODUCTION IS
COMPLETED - WHEN THE PRODUCT IS IN A MARKETABLE
CONDITION.
A.

The plain language of the Utah Code requires
ExxonMobil's gas and oil production to be
valued at the point production is complete.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-103

(2000) outlines the procedure

tor valuing oil and gas for purposes of taxation.

It

states:

For purposes of computing the severance tax, the
value of oil or gas at the well is the value
established under an arm's-length contract. . .
This is the primary method of valuation.

The

legislature has determined how the 'Value at the well" is to
be determined.
u

Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-101(19)

(2000) states,

'value at the well' means the

value of oil or gas at the

point production is completed."

The statutory definition

therefore relies not on a physical location, but the
completion of the process of production.
When interpreting a statute one of the fundamental
rules of construction is that the statute should be looked
at in its entirety in accordance with the purpose which was
sought to be accomplished.

Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake

10

C.

Production is not complete until the product
is in a marketable condition.

The plain language of sections 59-5-103(1)
59-5-101(19)

(2000) and

(2000) require oil and gas valuation to occur

at the point production is complete.

Production of oil is

not complete until the oil has been separated from the
water, gas and sediment which is necessary to place the
product in a marketable condition.
'"Production" is defined as u an act or process of
producing, the creation of value or wealth by producing
goods and services."
page 939 (1984) .
defined as:

Webster's II New Riverside Dictionary,

In relation to oil and gas, production is

"The phase of the petroleum industry that deals

with bringing the well fluids to the surface and separating
them and storing, gauging, and otherwise preparing the
product for the pipeline."
page 120 (3rd Ed., 1983).

A Dictionary of Petroleum Terms,

(See Addendum.)

"Complete" is

defined as "having all necessary or normal parts, elements,
or steps, completed is to make complete, to bring to an end,
conclude."
290.

Webster's II New Riverside Dictionary, supra, at

When the legislature defined value at the well as "the

point production is completed," it contemplated how oil and
gas is actually produced and sold in the marketplace.

18

Unless specifically stated, words or phrases used in a
statute are to be given their normal ordinary meaning.
Nelson v. Salt Lake County, 905 P.2d 872, 875 (Utah 1995).
Any ordinary understanding of the completion of the
production process is when the product is finished and ready
for market.

If a plant produces a product, production would

not be complete until the product is assembled, tested,
packaged and ready to ship.

A contract for the purchase of

the product at that point is a contract for "completed
production."
D.

The Terms should be construed to promote
uniformity.

The legislatures of neighboring Wyoming and Nevada have
concurred in the view that the production process is not
complete until the product is in a marketable condition.
Wyoming Statutes § 39-14-203(b)(ii)
Revised Statutes § 522.115(3).

(Supp. 1999); Nevada

(Addendum C.)

It is

significant that those states bordering Utah - Nevada and
Wyoming have statutorily3 adopted this definitionProduction from fields which may be separated only by a
geographical border should not change in character.

3

The -

Colorado has also adopted this position in Rogers v.
Westerman Farm Company, 29 P.3d 887 (Colo. 2001).
Discussed
at Section E herein.
19

E.

Other courts have interpreted the term "value
at the well" to include a requirement that the
product be placed in a marketable condition.

In Rogers v. Westerman Farm Company, 29 P.3d 887 (Colo.
2001), the Colorado Supreme Court did an extensive review of
the literature and case law surrounding the interpretation
of "value at the well" language in oil and gas royalty
agreements.

It specifically rejected the reasoning of those

jurisdictions that have found that gas was ''produced" at the
point it was physically severed.

The Colorado Court

concluded:
The point where a marketable product is first
obtained is the logical point where the
exploration and production segment of the oil and
gas industry ends, it is the point where the
primary objective of the lease contract is
achieved, and therefore is the logical point for
the calculation of royalty.
Id. at 904.
This case contains a lengthy and well-reasoned discussion of prior case law on this issue.

The Supreme

Courts of Oklahoma and Kansas, two significant oil producing
states, have also adopted the position that the producer's
responsibility is not complete until the product is in a
marketable condition.

See Mittelstaedt v. Santa Fe

Minerals, Inc., 954 P.2d 1203 (Okla. 1998); Sternberqer v.

23

0009

Marathon Oil Company. 894 P.2d 788 (Kan. 1995).
F.

Scholarly definitions of when production is
complete support the Division's position.

Professor Eugene Kuntz in his Treatise on Law of Oil
and Gas. Volume 3, Section 40.5(b)

(1989) states, "The acts

which constitute production have not ceased until a
marketable product has been obtained."

This view is echoed

by Professor Owen L. Andersen, Professor .of Oil, Gas and
Natural Resource Law, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
He states in discussing the term

XN

at the well":

The point at which gas first becomes a marketable
product would be established on the basis of a
known and real market. There would be no need to
deduct costs other than transportation because the
value of the gas as a first marketable product
would otherwise be known. In other words, unlike
the Piney Woods view, production would end at the
point where a first marketable product has in fact
been obtained, which is not necessarily at the
point of extraction.
Owen L. Anderson, Royalty Valuations; Should Royalty
Obligations be Determined Intrinsically, Theoretically, or
Realistically? 37 Nat. Resource J. 611, 641-642

(1997).

Likewise J.G. Martin, in Summary of Significant Gas and
Transportation Changes Affecting Producers in the 1990 ! s , 37
Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst. § 16-01 (1991), states that the
production function of the gas industry includes the

24
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producer being responsible for putting the gas in a
marketable state by removing its impuriLies and gathering
the gas from the various points of production

(wellhead) an

delivering it via gathering lines to a common point for
delivery on to the large diameter transmission lines.
II.

OIL PRODUCTION IS WHAT IS MEASURED AND VALUED.

ExxonMobil reports its production to the Utah Division
of Oil, Gas and Mining.
(1998).

Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-5(2) (g)

ExxonMobil measures its production at the same

points at which the Auditing Division has calculated value,
that is, at the lease automated custody transfer.
755.)

(R. 754-

The Division of Oil, Gas and Mining tracks the

disposition, that is, the sale or use of the commodities
produced.

Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-5(2)(i).

In performing

audits, the Auditing Division compares the volumes of oil
for which severance tax has been reported to the production
figures reported to the Division of Oil, Gas and Mining.
(R. 798-799. )
ExxonMobil does not constantly measure production at
the mouth of each well.
into a gathering system.

(R. 754.)

Rather, the wells flow

The gathering system contains a

manifold device that allows for the testing of wells on an

25
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)

The bulk of the brief in opposition filed by amici attempts
to argue the merits of the petition for rehearing.
are not addressed here.

Those points

The Motion to Strike deals only with the

propriety of filing of the petition.

In dealing with this issue

amici acknowledge that the ordinary or general rule forbids the
filing of Petition for Rehearing by amici.

3B C.J.S. Amicus

Curiae § 17, 4 Am.Jur. 2nd Amicus Curiae § 10.

However, amici

would have Court draw the inference that since this is a general
rule there must be exceptions.

They cite none.

Neither the

treatises cited nor the state's research indicate any exceptions
to this rule.
An amicus is not a party to the action and cannot assume the
functions of a party.

Montana Wildlife Federation v. Sager, 620

P.2d 1189 (1980); Nail v. Baca, 626 P.2d 1280 (NLM. 1980); Matter
of Does Adoption, 555 P.2d 906 (Ok. Et. App. 1976).

"It is horn

book law that an amicus curiae cannot take exceptions to the
rulings of the court; cannot take the case from one court another
by appeal or writ of error; cannot apply for a rehearing."

City

and County of Denver v. Denver Tramway Corporation, 23 F.2d 287
(8th Cir. 1927).
The antiquity of the cases stating this principle, and the
lack of case law during the intervening period challenging it,
support the common sense notion that an amicus, as a non-party,
cannot assume the functions of a party, nor may it assume
management or control over the action.
446 S.W.2d 807 (Mo. 1969).

Kansas City v. Kindle,

This includes filing for rehearing.

The proposed amendment to Rule 35 simply codifies what has
been the common law in this state since 1929, and what has been
the generally accepted rule as indicated by the cases and
authorities cited.

That is, that an amicus curiae cannot file a

2

petition for rehearing.
The State of Utah, and the Utah State Tax Commission,
therefore respectfully request that the Petition for Rehearing
filed by amici in the above captioned matter be stricken.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

jS1 ^ day of December, 2003.
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)
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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO STRIKE

Case No. 20021023-SC

)

Amicus are not a nparty to this action."
standing to petition the court for rehearing.

They have no
In Barnes v. Lehi

City, 279 P. 878, 837(Utah 1929), this Court addressed the
question and found that "council as friends of the court, having
no control or management of the case, are not entitled to
petition for a rehearing or to be further heard."
The consent of the parties to participate initially in
filing an amicus curiae brief does not extend to the amicus the
full rights of a party to the litigation.

0016

Having participated by

filing their brief and appearing at oral argument, amici have
fully filled their function.

Appellees, Utah State Tax

Commission and the State of Utah, object to this attempt by
council for amici to seek rehearing.

The Petition lies outside

the rules and should not be reviewed by the Court.
Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, the State of Utah and the Utah State Tax Commission
hereby move for an Order striking amici attempt to file a
petition for rehearing in the above-captioned matter.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

jO*^ day of December, 2003.

NrGARK L. S'NELSON
Assistant Attorney General
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